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SOUL-MAKING, THEOSIS, AND EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY 
 
ABSTRACT 
In Romans 5 St. Paul claims that death came into the world through Adam’s sin. Many have taken 
this to foist on us a fundamentalist reading of Genesis. If death is the result of human sin, then, 
apparently, there cannot have been death in the world prior to human sin. This however is 
inconsistent with contemporary evolutionary biology, which requires that death predates the 
existence of modern humans. Though the relationship between Romans 5, Genesis, and 
contemporary science has been much discussed – often with goal of dissipating the idea that the 
two are in conflict – the specific issue of death entering the world through sin has remained 
difficult to resolve.  I argue that the Eastern Orthodox tradition has the resources to respect both 
Romans 5 and contemporary science.  Appealing to a broadly Irenaean notion of soul-making, and 
to the idea of theosis, opens up space for an understanding of these passages that is both 
scientifically informed and Orthodox. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Genesis 1-3 has been an enduring source of discomfort for Christian theology, not least of all in 
the field of science and religion. Perhaps more than anything else, these passages have stuck in the 
public imagination as a source of conflict between science and (at least Christian) religion. There 
are of course many issues that arise from these passages, but a coarse-grained run-down of what 
might be thought of as the ‘core’ issues may look something like the following: 
1. Genesis 1 apparently depicts the earth as having been created over the course of six days, 
in the last of which human beings are created. As a result, many young earth creationists 
take the age of the earth to be less than 10,000 years. However, even given reconstructions 
of the genetic tree based on data concerning mitochondrial DNA, which place a common 
female ancestor of all current human beings as living between 90,000 and 200,000 years 
ago, the age of the earth suggested by Genesis 1 would still be well below the 
(approximately) 4.5 billion years given by radiometric dating techniques. 
2. Genesis 2 apparently depicts the first human beings as being created out of dust from the 
ground, and not, therefore, as descendants of other animals. However, evidence from 
comparative anatomy, fossil records, low-probability mutations common to the genomes 
of humans and other animals, and other sources, strongly suggest the descent of humans 
from non-human life. 
3. The doctrine of original guilt – held by Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, amongst others – 
holds that all human beings (perhaps with some special exceptions, such as Mary and 
Christ) inherit the guilt of Adam as a result of being his descendants. This entails the 
existence of a historical Adam who is the progenitor of all human beings. However, 
evolutionary theory – again, evidenced by comparative anatomy, fossil records, and 
common mutations in genomes etc. – treats human beings as being descendants from an 
evolving population (of more than two). This makes it extremely improbable that all 
human beings are descendants of two individuals. 
4. Paul’s claim in Romans 5:12 that ‘sin entered into the cosmos through one man, and death 
through sin’ apparently entails that there was no death in the world prior to human sin. 
However, radiometric dating techniques place the life, and death, of many creatures prior 
to the emergence of human beings and, therefore, human sin. 
Here I will largely set aside 1-3. Much has been written on these topics, but the broad shape of the 
debate is clear. Whether 1 and 2 constitute genuine instances of conflict between Christian 
theology and science depends on how plausible one takes to be the various readings of these texts 
that have been put forward. The result of any broadly non-literal understanding of the early 
chapters of Genesis will be, obviously enough, that the apparent conflict described in 1 and 2 does 
not arise. Similarly, interpretations that treat Genesis 1 as an account of functional origins – 
assigning roles to various facets of creation – rather than material origins – assigning causal histories 
to various facets of creation – avoid the kind of conflict described in 1, and interpretations that 
understand Adam and Eve typologically avoid the kind of conflict described in 2. Again, much has 
been written on this topic, but see (e.g.) John Walton (2009, 2011, 2015) for a representative 
example of a contemporary exegete who understands the relevant passages these ways, and Peter 
Bouteneff (2008) for an argument that many of the Eastern Fathers read these passages in a 
typological way.1 
The doctrine of original guilt, the source of the apparent conflict described in 3, needs to be 
unpacked somewhat. We need to distinguish here between ‘original sin’, understood as a universal 
human tendency towards sin, and ‘original guilt’ understood as the idea that all human beings inherit 
guilt from the primordial sin of Adam. Original guilt is largely associated with broadly Western 
Christian theology: Augustine, Luther and Calvin all endorsed some form of this idea. On the 
other hand, paradigmatically Eastern Orthodox thinkers, such as Irenaeus of Lyons, Basil of 
Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, and Maximus the 
Confessor, all explicitly reject the idea.2 ‘Original sin’, understood in the less loaded sense as a 
universal human tendency towards wrongdoing does not entail the existence of a historical Adam. 
‘Original guilt’, in the more loaded sense, however, does, or at least can, depending on how it is 
unpacked. Inheritance is, after all, a triadic relation involving two entities and one property: a thing 
inherits a property from another thing. If we human beings inherit guilt, we must inherit that guilt 
from someone. However, whether the conflict of 3 arises depends on how the mechanism of 
inheritance is understood. If original sin is transmitted from parent to child in the process of 
generation, as Augustine claimed, and every human being has this inherited guilt, then there must 
exist a single progenitor of all human beings. On the other hand, the idea that sin is transmitted 
via a mysterious unity of the human race (as, for instance, the Catechism of the Catholic Church 
has it) is prima facie compatible with human beings having descended from a population of more 
than two.  Just by participating in the human race, one could inherit the sin of Adam, regardless 
of ancestry.3 
The apparent conflicts in 1-3 then, do not appear to be necessarily insoluble.  So long as (plausibly 
enough) one understands Genesis 1-3 as doing something other than laying out the causal history 
of our universe and the emergence of life in it, and so long as one either eschews the notion of 
original guilt, or parses it in a way that doesn’t require that all are descended from a single historical 
Adam, then the much heralded conflicts of 1-3 do not arise.  Sketchy though this is, the gist should 
be clear: whether or not one eventually takes it, it is possible to chart a course that avoids the 
conflicts described in 1-3. However, 4 has proven less soluble. Paul’s claim is part of a difficult 
and contested passage (Romans 5:12-19) that is worth quoting in full: 
Therefore, just as sin came into the world through one man, and death came through 
sin, and so death spread to all because all have sinned—  sin was indeed in the world 
before the law, but sin is not reckoned when there is no law.  Yet death exercised 
dominion from Adam to Moses, even over those whose sins were not like the 
transgression of Adam, who is a type of the one who was to come. But the free gift is 
not like the trespass. For if the many died through the one man’s trespass, much more 
surely have the grace of God and the free gift in the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, 
abounded for the many.  And the free gift is not like the effect of the one man’s sin. 
For the judgment following one trespass brought condemnation, but the free gift 
following many trespasses brings justification.  If, because of the one man’s trespass, 
death exercised dominion through that one, much more surely will those who receive 
the abundance of grace and the free gift of righteousness exercise dominion in life 
through the one man, Jesus Christ.  Therefore just as one man’s trespass led to 
condemnation for all, so one man’s act of righteousness leads to justification and life 
for all.  For just as by the one man’s disobedience the many were made sinners, so by 
the one man’s obedience the many will be made righteous. (NRSV) 
Here, Paul ties together, in some way, sin and death though Adam, and, contrapuntally, 
righteousness and life through Christ. What is particularly problematic, with regard to the apparent 
conflict in 4, is the claim in verse 12 that ‘sin came into the world through one man, and death 
came through sin’. Romans 5 appears to support, indeed require that there was no death prior to 
human sin: that the earth was in a paradisal state prior to the activity of humans. Even if the 
Genesis narratives themselves don’t require it, Pauline theology seems to thrust into our unwilling 
hands a fundamentalist understanding of them. 
This has not gone unnoticed.  Robert John Russell, for instance, accepts that there is an insoluble 
conflict here and endorses ‘rejecting the biblical framework in which natural evil is the result of 
moral evil’ (Russell (2008, 254)).  In the same vein, Arthur Peacocke (1998, 375) noted that 
‘biological death of the individual, as the means of evolutionary creation of new species by natural 
selection, cannot now be attributed to human “sin”’, and Dennis Edwards (2006, 106) tells us that 
since evolutionary biology confirms that ‘death is deeply structured into the pattern of life’ we 
have to accept that ‘[b]iological death cannot be attributed to human sin’.  
Paul […] does not appear to maintain Augustine’s problematic idea that sin is somehow 
passed down genetically from our ancestor Adam, but he still maintains the causal 
connection between our sin and our death. It hardly needs saying that this flies in the face 
of all modern biological accounts of death, that death is entirely a natural and inevitable 
consequence of life. (Harris (2013, 140)) 
Returning to the outstanding problem of … how to understand Paul’s causal connection 
between human sin and death in his atonement theology of Romans 5 …, we must concede 
that, scientifically, these are two things which cannot be connected clearly at present. 
(Harris (2013, 157)) 
There appears then to be a real and significant conflict between the ‘biblical framework’ on the 
one hand and established science on the other.  I will argue however that things are not so 
intractable as they seem. Two characteristically Eastern Orthodox ideas – Irenaean soul-making 
theodicies and theosis – provide the resources to hold both that ‘death came into the world through 
sin’ and that death predated sin by millions of years. 
SOUL-MAKING AND THEOSIS 
I cannot possibly do justice, in a limited space, to either the content of broadly Irenaean theodicies, 
or to the reasons that might be brought to bear to motivate and defend them. However, 
characterising at least their lineaments – something like a common core of all soul-making 
theodicies – will help to make clear their role in addressing the questions at hand. It may be enough, 
even, to ward off some superficial misunderstandings that have made Irenaean theodicies seem 
less plausible than they might otherwise have seemed. 
Soul making theodicies start from axiological assumptions – assumptions about what is valuable, 
what constitutes the good life etc. – that, perhaps, are not widely held in contemporary western 
culture. The soul making theodicist does not take the sorts of goods manifested by a life of 
untroubled relaxation and entertainment, for instance, to be the highest goods available to human 
lives. Instead, self-transcending or self-sacrificial love, manifested in traits such as enemy-love, 
generosity, forgiveness, compassion, self-control, humility, truthfulness, integrity, and the like, is 
the most valuable thing available to a human life.4 Broadly Irenaean theodicies need not be wedded 
to the idea that these traits, excellent though they are, are ends in themselves, or, at least, merely 
ends in themselves. For (putting things crudely) self-transcending love is a prerequisite for 
relationship and union with the God of perfect self-transcending love.  This is the idea of theosis 
or deification: another characteristically Eastern Orthodox notion, associated with figures like 
Maximus the Confessor, and thought by some to be contained in 2 Peter where we are told that 
through divine power we can ‘escape the corruption that is in the world’ and ‘become participants 
of the divine nature’ (2 Peter 1:4, NRSV).   In union with God then, one participates, in some way, 
in the divine nature.  Virtue is required for one to be capable of receiving deification – theosis is 
only possible for those who have sufficiently oriented themselves towards God in the first place – 
but theosis itself also continues and perfects the process of soul-making.  John Anthony McGuckin 
describes it this way: 
[T]he grace of God ‘conforms’ the saints to his presence so that they can see and 
enjoy the divine radiance which is impossible for the unclean to witness except as a 
torment. The divine presence itself so changes the nature of the creature in this 
radical cleansing that this metamorphosis has to be spoken of as a transfiguration by 
grace. Theosis, therefore, is what the Orthodox East means by the perfection of the 
power of grace so irradiating the being of the redeemed saints that they too become 
light-filled, perfected by the mercy of God, in order to be conformed to the divine 
presence. (McGuckin (2008, 198-199))) 
Theosis – ultimate union with God – is the greatest good available to any human being,5 and, as 
we will discuss, perhaps for any creature, human or otherwise. 
With this kind of axiological hierarchy in mind, we are in a position to see, in outline, how soul-
making theodicies are intended to work. Arguments from evil trade on an interrelated cluster of 
claims; that there is suffering in this world and God would not permit suffering (e.g. J.L Mackie 
(1955)), or that there are instances of suffering in this world such that it is likely that God has no 
morally sufficient reasons to permit them (e.g. William Rowe (1979, 1991, 1996), Michael Tooley 
(2008, 2012)), or that the kind of distribution of suffering we find in our world is more likely given 
naturalism than theism (e.g. Paul Draper (1989)). These are the major premises in arguments to 
the conclusions, respectively, that God does not exist, that it is unlikely that God exists, or that 
evil favours the hypothesis of naturalism over the hypothesis of theism. The goal of theodicies 
quite generally is to undercut or rebut rational entitlement to these premises, by describing 
plausible, morally sufficient reasons why God would permit suffering, or particular instances of 
suffering, or the kind of distribution of suffering we find in our world, such that this distribution 
of suffering is (at least) no more likely given naturalism than theism.6 Irenaean-type theodicies in 
particular focus on soul-making as something that makes explicable, or even probable, the kinds of 
suffering we find in our world, given the existence of God. How does this go? The idea, roughly 
speaking (and I will say some things to refine this shortly) is that through trials one can develop 
virtues, for instance, the kind of virtues associated with, and manifestations of, self-transcending 
or self-sacrificial love mentioned above.  Because these virtues, and, ultimately, deification, are the 
most valuable things possible for a human being, the trials are worth it.  Here is Irenaeus himself: 
God has displayed long-suffering in the case of human apostasy; while the human 
person has been instructed by means of it, as the prophet says, “Your own apostasy 
will instruct you”.  God thus determined all things beforehand for the bringing of 
human persons to perfection, for their edification, and for the revelation of His 
dispensations, so that goodness may be made apparent, and righteousness perfected, 
and that the Church may be “conformed to the image of His Son”, and that the 
human person may finally be brought to such maturity so as to see and comprehend 
God. (Against Heresies, 4.37.7) 
Similar ideas were often expressed by the Cappadocians (Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and 
Gregory of Nazianzus) and Maximus the Confessor – for instance scattered throughout his Four 
Hundred Texts on Love – as well as by Thomas Aquinas, Ignatius of Loyola, and Friedrich 
Schleiermacher in the West.  In recent times, John Hick, in his 1966 Evil and the God of Love, brought 
about something of a revival in the idea.  Since then, the likes of Richard Swinburne (1998), Marilyn 
McCord Adams (1999), Eleonore Stump (2010), Paul Moser (2013), and Trent Dougherty (2014) 
have developed soul-making theodicies in various ways.  Hick usefully outlines the key set of ideas 
at play: 
There is thus to be found in Irenaeus the outline of an approach to the problem of evil 
which stands in important respects in contrast to the Augustinian type of theodicy. Instead 
of the doctrine that man was created finitely perfect and then incomprehensibly destroyed 
his own perfection and plunged into sin and misery, Irenaeus suggests that man was 
created as an imperfect, immature creature who was to undergo moral development and 
growth and finally be brought to the perfection intended for him by his Maker. Instead of 
the fall of Adam being presented, as in the Augustinian tradition, as an utterly malignant 
and catastrophic event, completely disrupting God’s plan, Irenaeus pictures it as something 
that occurred in the childhood of the race, an understandable lapse due to weakness and 
immaturity rather than an adult crime full of malice and pregnant with perpetual guilt. And 
instead of the Augustinian view of life’s trials as a divine punishment for Adam’s sin, 
Irenaeus sees our world of mingled good and evil as a divinely appointed environment for 
man’s development towards the perfection that represents the fulfilment of God’s good 
purpose for him. (Hick (2007, 214-5)) 
But it goes further than this. Finite, embodied, free creatures cannot be ready-made in a state of 
saintliness, ready for union with God, because for finite, embodied free creatures, what is constitutive 
of saintliness is ‘having learned and grown spiritually through conflict, suffering, and redemption’ 
(Hick (2007, 240)).  God could have made a world with no risk of severity, hardship, pain and 
grief, but given the ultimate, unsurpassable value of soul-making and deification, the trade-off 
would not have been worth it.  For in a world in which there is no risk of suffering, soul-making 
is not a possibility, because morally significant action is no longer possible.  Injury would not be 
possible.  If you slipped on the stairs God would immediately intervene to allow you to glide to 
the bottom unharmed.  Quite generally in fact, nature could not operate according to any very 
stable set of laws, because, to prevent any harm, God would have to continually intervene in a 
series of ‘special providences’ (Hick 1973, 42).  This would likely make developed sciences 
impossible.  There would be no need to eat, sleep, exercise or work, as no harm could possibly 
result from neglecting to do so.  You could not make bad decisions, because the consequences of 
your decisions would always be divinely massaged to neutralize any bad results.  According to the 
Irenaean, a world like this is incapable of developing the virtues:  
One can at least begin to imagine such a world. It is evident that our present ethical 
concepts would have no meaning in it. If, for example, the notion of harming someone is 
an essential element in the concept of a wrong action, in our hedonistic paradise there 
could be no wrong actions – nor any right action in distinction from wrong. Courage and 
fortitude would have no point in an environment in which there is, by definition no danger 
or difficulty. Generosity, kindness and the agape aspect of love, prudence, unselfishness, 
and all other ethical notions which presuppose life in an objective environment could not 
even be formed. Consequently such a world, however well it might promote pleasure, 
would be very ill adapted for the development of the moral qualities of human personality. 
In relation to this purpose it might be the worst of all possible worlds! (Hick (1973, 41–
42)) 
The necessary cost of a world in which the greatest goods are available to us, is a world in which 
we live with the risk of suffering (a risk which will sometimes be actualized, sometimes appallingly 
so).  Suffering may be truly terrible, but the opportunity for soul-making in a risky world, and one’s 
ultimate (unending) deification, defeat the badness of (temporary) suffering.  The first short 
segment of our infinite lives may include much that is bad, and even horrific, but when the risk of 
this is a necessary means to an unsurpassable good, the badness is defeated by the good.  Seeing this, 
from the vantage point of deified eternal life with God, we will not wish away those bad parts of 
our life histories.  (See Adams (1999, 167).) 
Five points are worth bearing in mind here. The first is that what is important is not just that the 
goods attained outweigh the bad. If this were sufficient, then God could not care less about what 
happens to us in this life, and still be in moral good standing so long as sufficiently many good 
things of sufficient degrees of goodness happen to us in on the far side of the eschaton. (Something 
that is pretty easily achieved if the latter is everlasting.) But this cannot be sufficient. If someone 
were to punch you in the face, then offer you £100,000 in compensation, the goodness of the 
compensation may well outweigh the badness of the punch (and you may even be glad, in 
retrospect, to have been punched), but this would not be the act of a perfectly loving person. So 
although it’s necessary, according to most soul-making theodicies, that the eventual goods will 
outweigh one’s current suffering, it’s not sufficient that they do so. 
Typically (and this is the second point) what’s thought to be required here is that the suffering be 
connected to the eventual flourishing in the right kind of way. Some soul making theodicies reject 
the ‘crude’ idea that the connection is merely causal, that suffering is merely a means to 
countervailing good (see Dougherty (2014, 108)). Rather it is in some way constitutive of a certain 
kind of value.7 Going through trials is not just a means to self-transcending love. Going through 
trials is constitutive of growing into self-transcending love. Responding to suffering in a saintly way 
isn’t (just) a case of the suffering being an efficient cause of saintliness. Responding to suffering in 
a saintly way is constitutive of saintliness itself. That’s what it is to be a saint, and a human being 
can’t grow into sainthood otherwise. 
The third point is that the sorts of goods at issue here do not all require any specific instance of 
suffering. What these goods do require is the risk, and often the significant risk, of suffering. No 
system in which these goods are available is one which the significant risk of suffering is not 
present. This is related to the idea that God permits rather than brings about (or even wills) suffering. 
God did not will the gulag so that there would be more opportunities for soul-making. However, 
in creating a world with the kind of latitude required for human beings to be capable of morally 
significant action, and, as a result, capable of growing in virtue towards saintliness, the risk of 
suffering, and even terrible suffering, must be real.8 To endorse Irenaean theodicies, one need not 
hold that the gulag ultimately makes the world a better place, but, rather, that a world which 
includes opportunities for saint-making must also include the possibility of the gulag. As 
Dougherty (2014, 105) notes, as a result of the latitude God gives to human beings, ‘Perhaps God 
got “unlucky” and ended up with a world on the rougher edge of the spectrum within the range 
of permissible Saint-fostering worlds.’ 
The fourth point is that Irenaean theodicies are unabashedly eschatological. There are some kinds of 
suffering that are not defeated in this life, some kinds of physical anguish or psychological 
brokenness that are not repaired or that work to constitute some greater good for the person who 
suffers them. The saint-making process does not end with this life however. If God’s work with 
an individual is unfinished at the point of bodily death, then God’s work will continue with that 
individual, one way or another, after the point of bodily death.9 This eschatological element isn’t 
an afterthought or an add-on. Not only is the ‘life of the world to come’ a central tenet of Christian 
theology, it is logically required by the existence of a loving God in a world that includes suffering. 
The Irenaean holds that if there is a loving God, and if there is suffering, then there must ultimately 
be redemption or defeat of that suffering. And if this requires an afterlife, then, if there is suffering, 
the existence of God simply entails the existence of an afterlife. In other words, a requirement of 
consistent theism is that there by an afterlife: the two come as an inseparable package (Dougherty 
(2014, 111)). 
The fifth point is that true saintliness, characterised by real self-transcending or self-sacrificial love 
is hard won. Forging the highest virtues, required for the greatest union with God, can involve very 
significant trials. Truly saintly people display a depth of virtue that can seem almost unimaginable 
from the point of view of the morally unexceptional person.10  And it may be that the greater one’s 
saintliness, the greater one’s eventual union with God – the ultimate form of human flourishing – 
so that moral greatness and human flourishing co-vary for human beings (Stump (2010, 387)). 
Objections to Irenaean theodicies then typically centre around the idea that moral excellence and 
union with God don’t defeat the tendency for suffering to make one’s life bad on the whole (where 
the whole life encompasses both this life and the afterlife). For the Irenaean, this kind of objection 
simply underestimates how great, valuable, and blissful greater union with God is, and also the 
extent to which this kind of existence can reconcile one with events of the past. Perhaps, in union 
with God, past suffering, no matter how horrendous, will simply no longer have any emotional or 
psychological grip on those who have suffered.  Or, objections centre around the claim that soul-
making really does require the kind risk of suffering we find in our world.  For the Irenaean, this 
underestimates how exacting saintlike moral excellence is, and the extent to which this kind of 
self-transcending love is hard won. 
On the Irenaean picture, humans did not begin their time on earth as perfect and then 
(mysteriously) behave imperfectly, bringing about the Fall. Instead, humans began as finite, limited, 
and sinful creatures, who require the right kind of environment to grow into saintly people, ready 
for deification.  This environment requires the risk of suffering, and – if we follow through the 
consequences of Hick’s thought experiment on the necessary environment for morally significant 
action – death. Immortality in a sinful world, may act against soul-making.   As Gregory of 
Nazianzus suggestively says: 
But even here he drew a profit of a kind: death, and an interruption to sin; so wickedness 
did not become immortal, and the penalty became a sign of love for humanity.  That, I 
believe, is the way God punishes!  (Oration 38, §12) 
Further, the inevitability of death may itself be an important prompt in the soul-making process, 
since it stimulates human beings to place trust in God rather than the inevitably ephemeral things 
of this world: 
  
Paul thinks of God as having subjected creation to futility for the sake of prompting 
humans to enter into a life of cooperation with God as their priority over all other 
sources of security (Rom. 8:20–21).  He also puts this lesson in terms of the human 
need to die to all anti-God (including selfish) power in order to live cooperatively with 
God in God’s life-giving, resurrection power (see 2 Cor. 4:7–11, Phil. 3:7–11, Rom. 
6:13, 8:36–39, Col. 3:1–6).  A similar theme emerges from the teaching of Jesus in the 
Gospels.  John’s Gospel, for instance, portrays Jesus as saying: “Very truly, I tell you, 
unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains just a single grain; but if 
it dies, it bears much fruit.  Those who love their life lose it, and those who hate their 
life in this world will keep it for eternal life” (John 12:24–25; cf. Mark 8:34–36, Luke 
14:27, Matt. 10:38–39). Accordingly, the divine salvation of humans faces a sharp, 
severe conflict between familiar human life and God’s morally perfect life.  Human life 
must die into God’s life, as humans appropriate God’s unique power via rigorous 
struggle. (Moser (2013, 160-1)) 
 
Death and sin are here linked, because death is a means, if a severe one, of prompting humans to 




At first blush, the broad features of this theodicy appear to rule out the possibility that it could 
apply to non-human, animal suffering.11  The reasons for this are obvious.  Moral shortcomings 
may be an impediment to fuller union with God, but only for those creatures with the cognitive 
capacities required for moral responsibility.  Non-human animals do not – at least for the most 
part – have these cognitive capacities.12  On the face of it, it is not possible for the risk of suffering 
to be a prerequisite for animals to be raised into saintliness – a point famously made by C.S. Lewis: 
The problem of animal suffering is appalling; not because the animals are so numerous 
… but because the Christian explanation of human pain cannot be extended to animal 
pain.  So far as we know beasts are incapable of either sin or virtue: therefore they can 
neither deserve pain or be improved by it. (Lewis (1940), quoted in Southgate (2008, 
41)) 
While the Irenaean should not think that all human suffering is deserved, they are committed to 
the thought that the risk of suffering is required for the development of virtue.  For this reason, 
Irenaean theodicy is often thought to be inapplicable to the problem of animal suffering.  Murphy 
(2007, 131) notes that ‘John Hick’s account of “soul-making,” strike this author as still too 
anthropocentric, focussing as they do on good for us coming as the consequence of suffering’, 
and Southgate (2008, 11) criticises Hick as having an ‘invincibly human-centered view’.  
This much is surely right.  Hick’s own development of the Irenaean theodicy was anthropocentric 
in this sense.  However, the Irenaean need not stop where Hick left off; Irenaean theodicies can 
be quite naturally expanded beyond their traditionally anthropocentric domain.  Dougherty (2014) 
for instance develops his soul-making theodicy with animals explicitly in mind.  How does this 
work? 
A number of authors have, rightly in my view, insisted on the need for animal eschatology.13 
Without animal immortality, it is very difficult to see how some animal lives – those that contain 
much suffering and little flourishing – could be overall worthwhile for the creatures themselves, 
and so permissible for an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly loving God to allow.  On 
Dougherty’s view ‘[t]he paradigm case of the defeat of evil is when the individual endorses their 
role in the drama of creation and salvation and is glad to have played it (which might be different 
than being glad for it)’ (Dougherty 2014, 147).  Non-humans however lack the cognitive capacities 
required to understand how their suffering could have contributed to God’s plan of salvation – or 
even to grasp that their suffering could have contributed to God’s plan of salvation – in such a way 
that they could, ultimately, come to see their past suffering as worthwhile.  In fact, it is plausible 
that many, if not all, human beings themselves lack the cognitive capacities to understand how 
their suffering could have contributed to God’s plan of salvation.  This is where the doctrine of 
theosis comes in.  According to some understandings of theosis, humans, in their immortal, 
resurrected lives, ‘will never cease growing in knowledge, power, and love, and thus, in a sense, 
never cease to approximate God’s nature’ (ibid., 143).  In Pauline thought, the resurrected σῶμα 
πνευματικόν (‘spiritual body’) is, after all, something far less limited in its capacities than the 
perishable σῶμα ψυχικόν (often rendered ‘natural body’, though arguably misleadingly).  Theosis 
then, is utterly transformative, and the transformation is cognitive as well as ethical.  Deified 
human beings have far greater cognitive capacities than their non-deified counterparts.  The point 
here is that all this applies, mutatis mutandis, to the animal case.  Animals too, in union with God, 
will ‘never cease growing in knowledge, power, and love’.  At some point in the process of theosis, 
they too will have the cognitive capacity to understand how their suffering could have contributed 
to God’s plan of salvation, in such a way that they could, ultimately, come to see their past suffering 
as worthwhile.  When theosis enters the picture, the difference between human and non-human 
life is no longer a difference that makes the eventual defeat of animal suffering less intelligible than 
the defeat of human suffering.  There is no impediment then to a theodicy centred around the 
Orthodox notion of theosis applying to the non-human realm just as readily as the human. 
Soul-making gravitates around the notion of forging one’s character over time, often necessarily 
through the severe process of confronting and responding to trials, adversity and suffering.  I 
would suggest that there is something of great, unique, perhaps unsurpassable, value in – 
cooperatively, synergistically with a perfect God – being the author of one’s own virtuous 
character. And this, quite generally, will involve overcoming adversity, and facing up to travails 
with truthfulness, courage and compassion.  We make this kind of axiological judgement all the 
time.  We admire archetypal hero figures precisely because of the way they forge their character in 
the process of facing adversity.  There is more value in the heroic life than in the life of leisure.  At 
the same time though, this is hard to see in this life because, often, the adversity is so great and the 
growth so meagre.  But from the vantage point of eternal, blissful, ever-deepening union and 
growth with God, one could come to see this as an integral part of a valuable, flourishing life, and 
come to be glad to have come through the process and emerged on the other side.  Theosis is the 
process which both makes possible continued moral flourishing, and which makes it the case that 
this moral development will converge with happiness and flourishing more generally in the long 
run.  Theosis is also the process that makes the very idea of moral flourishing equally applicable to 
non-human sentient life.  The power of this kind of theodicy lies in the fact that there is no item 
of suffering that could not be woven into the story of one’s ultimate flourishing in this way. 
 
THE ADVANTAGES OF SOUL-MAKING AND THEOSIS 
My aims here are ecumenical rather than sectarian; I do not think that theodicies centered around 
soul-making and theosis should be accepted in place of other accounts.  Plausibly, and as Southgate 
(2008, 15) emphasizes, any adequate theodicy will be multifaceted or ‘compound’, drawing on a 
number of different mutually supportive strands of thought.  However, theodicies which appeal 
to soul-making and theosis as facets of the overall account have particular advantages, that I will 
sketch out all too briefly here. 
A number of thinkers have recently appealed to ‘only way’ or ‘no-choice’ theodicies in providing 
an explanation of why God might allow the death and suffering associated with evolutionary 
processes.  Broadly speaking, only way theodicies argue that the only way to bring about adaptive 
complexity – and the beauty and value inherent in complex life – was through evolutionary 
processes.  The value of complex life is so great that, given the only way to bring it about is through 
evolutionary processes, God was warranted in permitting these evolutionary processes to take 
place.  Robin Attfield (2006) has developed this kind of view at length, and it is part of the 
multifaceted theodicy suggested by Southgate (2008).  Rolston (2003) and Murphy (2007, 131) also 
suggest a theodicy in which suffering is an ‘unavoidable by-product of conditions in the natural 
world that have to obtain in order that there be intelligent life at all’.  There is much to be said for 
these kinds of accounts; it is instructive to consider how, in an interconnected universe, changing 
one parameter can lead to unintended consequences.  (See, for instance, Attfield’s discussion of 
Hume’s suggested “improvements” to the natural world.)  However, they have limitations which 
do not apply to the soul-making theodicy sketched above.  The first is that the modal claim is not 
obviously true.  Though it may be that the only way for adaptive complexity to arise through 
evolutionary processes involves suffering and death, it does not follow that the only way available 
to God to bring about adaptive complexity is through suffering and death, because God, being God, 
could presumably have created complex creatures ex nihilo.  (Russell (2008, 254-5) also makes this 
point.) Of course, we know that this is not in fact how things have panned out, but that is precisely 
the point; if God would have had better options available, the fact that these options were not 
taken constitutes evidence against the existence of God.  Soul-making theodicies make their own 
modal ‘only way’ claim – that adversity and environments including the risk of suffering – are the 
only way in which finite creatures can develop saintly qualities.  Arguably however, this modal 
claim is more plausible than the claim that God could not have brought about complex life without 
bringing into play evolutionary processes.  The second is that no choice arguments appear to 
assume that the end, in this case, justifies the means.  This though is not obvious.  If the only way 
to bring about complex life was via the squalid misery of billions of creatures – a misery that served 
no purpose for those creatures – then perhaps bringing about complex life was never morally 
justifiable.  The worry is that God starts to appear Stalin-like: happy to crush the weak underfoot 
on the road to achieving utopia.  Animal soul-making avoids this consequence.  The suffering of 
any given creature is something that, in the long run, can be woven into a process that ultimately 
benefits that creature.  Here, I take the point made by Southgate (2008, 12) as well as Hart (2005) 
and the likes of Dostoyevsky, that God must have done God’s best by each creature.  Soul-making 
theodicies can live up to this demand.  This makes soul-making theodicies particularly well-suited 
as evolutionary theodicies.  It’s often said that what’s troubling about evolution is that it reveals 
the scale of suffering and death, i.e. the sheer number of creatures which have suffered and died.  It 
seems to me that this is a mistake.  Because God is supposed to be perfect, one unwarranted item 
of suffering is just as much and objection as a billion unwarranted items of suffering.  There is a 
sense in which the task of the theodicist is at once more and less daunting than it is often given 
credit for being.  If God has done wrong by just one creature, then God does not exist.  But if 
there is an account of why, for any given creature, God may have had good reasons for allowing 
it to suffer and die, then (assuming the account is a general one, not appealing to the specific life 
of that creature insofar as it differs from other creatures) this account will generalise to all creatures.  
The soul-making theodicy sketched above is general in this way.  The length and scale of 
evolutionary suffering then pose no special problems for the soul-making theodicy, that shorter, 
smaller scale distributions of suffering do not already pose.  Finally, soul-making theodicies have 
a ready answer to the question of why God did not simply skip the whole troublesome episode of 
this life and go straight to creating heaven.  Heaven is theosis, and theosis is the (necessarily hard-
won) result of the severe soul-making process. 
 
EXPLANATION BY CONSTRAINT 
As I have argued, theosis-based theodicies constitute a real advance on the topic, and make a 
worthy addition to any multi-faceted approach to theodicy (even, and perhaps in particular, 
evolutionary theodicy).  Our primary aim though was to draw on the ideas of soul-making and 
theosis to explain how it is possible to consistently hold that ‘death came into the world through 
sin’ and that death predated sin by millions of years, showing that there is no necessary conflict 
between this part of the ‘biblical framework’ and contemporary science.  We are now almost in a 
position to see why this is the case. 
Consider how a perfect God would structure a world containing creatures with morally significant 
freedom, and the inevitable sinfulness that results from this freedom.  On the picture presupposed 
by soul-making theodicies, the greatest good possible for creatures is theosis, in which moral 
flourishing and happiness are combined.  Theosis though requires saintliness on the part of these 
creatures.  The best environment then for these creatures is one that contains opportunities for 
growth in virtue, and prompts – perhaps even severe prompts – that will encourage growth in 
virtue.  As we saw, and important prompt is death, because the inevitability of death acts as a 
powerful prompt for creatures to place their ultimate trust in God, rather than ephemera of 
(infinitely!) less value.  A perfect God who seeks the best for creation – where that creation will 
include free and hence sinful creatures – will have good reason to bring about a world in which 
there is death.  There is death in the world because of sin.  But the link here is not causal, it is 
structural.  The idea that sin caused death, we will recall, was problematic, because it entailed that 
sin predated death; if one event causes another, then that event must be earlier than, or 
simultaneous with, the event it causes.  Causal priority requires temporal priority, or at least 
contiguity.  The kind of structural ‘because’ under consideration here however requires no such 
thing. 
The nature of the association between sin and death, on the picture suggested here, can be 
illuminated with an example from the recent literature on scientific explanation.  In the more 
Augustinian picture, sin provides a causal explanation of death.  Adam (or some early human) sins, 
and the effect of this sin is death.  The explanation here, in contrast, is an explanation by constraint 
rather than a causal explanation. For reasons to do with the great good of theosis, any ‘system’ 
ordained by God that contains sinful creatures must also be one in which these creatures face 
death.  Marc Lange provides a compelling account of explanation by constraint, of which 
mathematical explanations are a species: 
A distinctively mathematical explanation works (I propose) not by describing the 
world’s actual causal structure, but rather by showing how the explanandum arises 
from the framework that any possible physical system (whether or not it figures in 
causal relations) must inhabit, where the “possible” systems extend well beyond 
those that are logically consistent with all of the actual natural laws.  (Lange (2017, 
30-1)) 
There are many examples of explanation by constraint in the natural sciences, but a simple case 
will serve to illustrate the idea.  It is impossible to tile a rectangular wall with 191 tiles (unless it is 
one tile wide) because 191 is a prime number.14  Since a prime number cannot be divided evenly 
into another number there is no way to arrange the tiles into any number of equally long rows 
(unless that number is one).  The kind of explanation here is structural rather than causal.  For a 
perfect God, creating a world that will include sinful creatures without allowing for death in that 
world is akin to trying to tile a rectangular wall with a prime number of tiles.  There is no 
‘arrangement’ which is simultaneously most conducive to theosis for sinful creatures and which 
does not involve worldly death.15  Given the great good of theosis, God’s will that we receive the 
greatest possible goods, the fact that, for sinful creatures, theosis requires soul-making, and the 
fact that soul-making requires death, any possible ‘system’ in which there are sinful creatures will 
be one in which there is death.  The framework that any possible system must inhabit requires it.  
To reiterate, on this view, the Pauline association between sin and death is very much real, but 
because this association isn’t causal, it doesn’t require that sin precedes death.16  Evolution, of 
course, necessarily involves death, and there is a sense in which it follows from this that human 
beings, as part of the evolved natural order, are subject to death irrespective of sin.17  The question 
though is why a perfect God would create a world like this in the first place.  On the assumption 
that the world was created by God, the explanation for it being a world governed by laws that 
would end up including death is that it is a world governed by laws that would end up producing 
free, sinful creatures.  In this sense, it is because God chose to create a world including (inevitable) 
sin that God choose to create a world including death.  In this sense, death is in the world because 
of sin. 
There has been a renewed interest in both soul-making theodicies and the doctrine of theosis in 
recent decades.  This is to the good, not least of all because, in combination, they serve to advance 
the debate on theodicy and offer a distinctive response to animal suffering which could plausibly 
play a role in any multifaceted theodicy, but also because they make intelligible how it could both 
be true that death is somehow explained by sin, as the biblical framework has it, and that death 
has predated sin by millions of years, as evolutionary theory clearly entails. 
 
1 Many of these figures took these passages to be both historical and symbolic or typological.  This may seem strange.  
To the contemporary mind, the historical and the symbolic are usually understood as exclusive categories.  History is 
the result of unfolding facts whereas symbolism is the result of authorial intent.  If God is the author of reality 
however, the two can converge.  The picture that emerges in Bouteneff (2008), is most significant early biblical 
exegetes did think that Genesis 1-3 described literal historical events, but that its theological significance lay in its 
symbolic meaning. 
2 To what extent original guilt has become embedded in Western Christian theology more generally is up for debate. 
The claim that all human beings inherit Adam’s guilt is strongly suggested, for instance, by Article II of the 
Augsburg Confession: 
 
[S]ince the fall of Adam all men begotten in the natural way are born with sin, that is, without the fear of 
God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence; and that this disease, or vice of origin, is truly sin, 
even now condemning and bringing eternal death upon those not born again through Baptism and the 
Holy Ghost. 
 
The Catechism of the (Roman) Catholic Church on the other hand 
(http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p1s2c1p7.htm#III) teaches that inherited original sin is only “sin” in an 
analogical sense, and ‘does not have the character of a personal fault in any of Adam’s descendants’. Inherited “sin”, 
in the sense elaborated there not only does not obviously entail inherited guilt, as endorsed by Augustine, Luther 
and Calvin, but seems to positively reject the notion. 
3 This is not to say that this way of parsing original guilt is free from other problems, but there is no immediate 
conflict with evolutionary history here. 
4 See Trent Dougherty (2014, 120) on this, and Marilyn McCord Adams (1999, 12) for the idea, specifically, that 
religious believers attribute value to different things, and to different extents, than non-believers. John Hick (2007, 
256-7) also makes this point: ‘Antitheistic writers almost invariably … assume that the purpose of a loving God 
must be to create a hedonistic paradise ; and therefore to the extent that the world is other than this, it proves to 
them that God is either not loving enough or not powerful enough to create such a world.’ 
5 See Eleonore Stump (2010, 387) for an expression of this idea, in the context of defending a Thomist soul-making 
theodicy. 
6 This is not to suggest that theodicy is necessary to undercut arguments from evil.  See, for instance, my [reference 
suppressed]. 
7 See also Southgate and Robinson (2007) and Southgate (2008, ch.3) for the distinction between ‘good-harm 
analyses’ that take the good in question to be: (i) a causal consequence of the harm or possibility of harm; (ii) only 
achievable through a process that includes the possibility or necessity of harm; or (iii) inherently or constitutively 
inseparable from the harm. 
8 It should be clear that this does not make Irenaean theodicies equivalent to free-will defences. Soul-making requires 
free will, but, though free will is a great good, it is not the good of free will itself that (or, at least alone) provides the 
morally sufficient reason to permit suffering. The relevant good is saintliness, and concomitant theosis. 
9 Plausibly, any theodicy that links suffering to a greater good, will require this eschatological dimension if the 
greater good is to be sufficiently good so as to have been worth the suffering.  A number of authors have made this 
point.  See, for instance, Russell (2008, 266), Southgate (2008, ch.5), and Ward (1982, 202), for discussion. 
10 See, for instance, the injunction in Matthew 5:48 to ‘be perfect, as your Heavenly Father is perfect’. 
                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
11 I thank an anonymous referee for encouraging me to address this issue. 
12 See my [reference suppressed] for some of the cognitive differences between humans and other animals. 
13 See Southgate (2008, ch.5) for a helpful overview.  Southgate mentions thinkers as diverse as Denis Edwards, Jay 
McDaniel, Jürgen Moltmann, Robert Russell, Keith Ward, and John Wesley in this respect. 
14 The example is from Shaprio (2000, 217). 
15 We can weaken the thesis and retain the main point.  What is required more precisely is that environments 
including death are one of the kinds of environments most conducive to soul-making.  This retains the idea that God 
could be warranted in creating a world including death because it is a world that will go on to develop free, and 
hence sinful, creatures. 
16 I hope it is clear that I am, in no way, attempting to provide a reading of Genesis 1-3, or of Romans 5.  The task 
here is not exegetical, but philosophical.  The question is under which circumstances it can both be true that death is 
inextricably tied to sin and true that death has been a feature of our world long before creatures capable of sin 
inhabited it.  (The problem was that it looked as though there were no circumstances under which both of these 
could be true.)  The answer is that, the circumstances under which both of these can be true are those in which the 
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